Signing out

I have used this blog for about four years now and it is time to give it a rest for multiple reasons. For one, I am migrating to a new platform (comment if you wish to follow!). Secondly, I feel that many of these articles show a more emotional character and are not as well-argued. Over the years, I have developed past opinions to evidence and I wish that my new blog not be tainted by my past baggage. Hence, I shall strive to write more professionally and perhaps even check my some of my biases at the keyboard! Third, given certain developments in my life, I wish to start blogging using my name instead of the pseudonym I had appropriated all this time.

In any case, I hope to see anyone following this blog on my new one. Thanks for reading.

[Special note to Amit: I read your comment on a post I have now removed and I the answer is yes, I have read what you mentioned. The point you raise is significant and I will not discuss it in a reply but will post on the issue soon at my new blog. Please let me know how I can forward you the new url and such. Thank you for reading.]

BRIC(k)S for Brains

The formation of a loose cabal by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (joined in April 2011) was, I hoped in my naiveté, the sign of a political power base in the international arena that would bring the much required checks and balances on American hyperpower and unilateralism. Unfortunately, the bloc has been a sore disappointment in what seems to be its political weltanshauung in its short presence as a notable actor. To be fair to the countries involved, the term BRIC was coined in 2001 by then-head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neill, and the countries did not come together of their own accord to form an organisation. Nonetheless, these countries have now come together to work for a 21st century that would be more equitable for themselves, converting their growing economic power to greater geopolitical clout.

BRICS undoubtedly offers many opportunities for India. Although no formal treaties linking the five countries exist as of yet, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa make up the raw materials component of the association, while China and Brazil are the manufacturing hubs. In a jab to economic theorists, India seems to have moved from an agricultural phase directly to the services phase of economic development without a clear industrial phase and India remains the service provider in BRICS. Any free trade agreement or economic treaty between these countries would involve about 25% of the world's landmass, 40% of the world population, and an economic footprint (in terms of PPP-adjusted GDP) of $18.5 trillion (nearly twice that of the United States), a consumer pie unrivalled in economic history. Other countries, such as Turkey, Mexico, Nigeria, and Indonesia from the N-11, aspire to become members of this economic behemoth soon, making it larger, richer, and more powerful. In a 2007 revised report, Goldman Sachs predicted that from 2007 to 2020, India's GDP per capita in US$ terms will quadruple", and that the Indian economy will surpass the United States by 2043. It states that the four nations as a group will overtake the G7 in 2032. The total BRICS economic output accounted for 18 percent of the total global economy output in 2010 and is expected to pass the G-7's output by 2035.

All this seems to be remarkably good news for those who wish to see the balance of power shift from the Atlantic to the Indian and Pacific oceans and hope for the resurgence of Indian power after almost four centuries (or nine, if one accepts Sangh politics). However, India has some treacherous waters to navigate through before it wholeheartedly embraces the BRICS agenda. Of course, there are a few questions looming about the BRICS dream in the first place. For one, it is entirely possible that one or more of these countries do not live up to the projections in the future due to political or other circumstances. Secondly, Russian and Chinese disregard for human rights may become more of an international issue in the future – while this augurs well for other BRICS members, any formal grouping of these nations is bound to be tainted by Russian and Chinese actions. Third, the demographic advantage of a youthful population enjoyed by Brazil and China may fade in three decades. Furthermore, it is uncertain how the increasing gender imbalance in China (and India) will affect their economies and social structures. Fourth, the imbalance between BRICS countries themselves – China accounts for about 70% of the combined BRICS GDP – basically makes BRICS into a Chinese bloc. Admittedly, the countries have the independence to act on their own when it serves their interests, but this still raises the question of what BRICS can offer to Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. As analyst David Rothkopf wrote in Foreign Policy, “Without China, the BRICs are just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the whine that goes with it. China is the muscle of the group and the Chinese know it. They have effective veto power over any BRIC initiatives because without them, who cares really? They are the one with the big reserves. They are the biggest potential market. They are the U.S. partner in the G2 (imagine the coverage a G2 meeting gets vs. a G8 meeting) and the E2 (no climate deal without them) and so on.” [BRICS statistics]

Moving to my reservations about India in BRICS, it seems to me that India is by far the most pro-America country in the group – in a 2004 worldwide poll, India was only behind the Philippines in seeing Bush and the United States as a positive force in the world. India has much to gain from closer ties with the United States for at least the next two decades. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership and the Indo-American nuclear deal have cleared the way for significant cooperation in technology that India's ailing defence efforts and energy sectors need. The recent condemnation of the NATO-enforced no-fly zone over Libya came in for criticism from BRICS when India had no geostrategic advantage in such a move. Even if we look past politics and to morality (which is a risky endeavour), there is no doubt that Muammar Qaddafi is not a benevolent leader. Libya's past attempts at making nuclear and chemical weapons, and its support of terrorism should give pause to any Indian statesman in seeking better ties with the country, for who should be the targets of such terrorism if not the United States and India? Libya's ties, or rather Qaddafi's ties, not surprisingly, are strongest with China among the BRICS (although Europe dominates trade with about 64%).

It is heartening to note that India has in the past broken with BRICS on issues vital to her security environment. For example, in a IAEA vote in March 2011, India voted in favour of the British Nuclear Fuel Assurance plan meant to ensure continuous supply of nuclear fuel or low-enriched uranium to countries desirous of developing nuclear power for peaceful uses even in the face of adverse political developments between the donor and recipient country.

Despite the oft-stated benefits of BRICS, India is yet to get an endorsement from the group for a permanent seat in the UN SecurityCouncil – China has not supported India to date and the support from BRICS for South African and Indian candidacy for the UNSC has diluted India's position. Although a joint statement issued at the end of the recently concluded BRICS summit in Sanya declared that Russia and China would like to see India play a larger role in the UN, there was no indication that China would back India's bid for inclusion into the UN sanctum sanctorum.

Meanwhile, China has extracted BRICS support for its currency, the yuan, to be one of the currencies in the basket underlying the special drawing rights of the IMF. This is despite the devalued currency hurting exports from India and Brazil. The Sanya summit also resulted in a pact in which the five countries pledged to use their own currencies in giving credit and loans to each other rather than the dollar. Although this challenges the power of the almighty dollar, its main beneficiary is China as it holds trade surpluses with all the other BRICS. The pact could, forseeably, position the yuan as an alternative to the dollar. Even if trade is not impacted by this initially, holdings of the yuan will funnel more trade to China as China stands the most capable of giving massive lines of credit to its trading partners.

The inclusion of South Africa into BRICS, though in some ways a welcome move, threatens to undermine the purpose of IBSA, the India-Brazil-South Africa business consortium. Arguably, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey, popularly known as the “growth economies” (each accounting for about 1% of global GDP) have a better claim than South Africa to join BRIC. The South African economy of $285 billion compares poorly with South Korea’s ($830 billion), Turkey’s ($615 billion) and Mexico’s ($875 billion). But South Africa has one distinctive asset: it is the “gateway” to an entire continent for trade and investment – and for making geopolitical forays. Its other asset is that it has China as its largest trading partner. By bringing South Africa into the BRIC orbit, China challenges the US to rework its Africa strategy. How do you patrol the “global commons” in the Indian Ocean without a grip on the Cape of Good Hope? To be fair to China, the challenge is of diplomatic suppleness with no trace of hard power - yet. China's overture to South Africa can only be seen as a long-term move. Bringing South Africa into BRIC bought China goodwill with its largest trading partner in Africa and gives it a significant advantage in its rivalry with India in Africa.

Thus, although BRICS may have some advantages for India, so far it seems simply an exercise in vanity to be included in a group of the most promising emerging economies by as famous a company as Goldman Sachs. There are many kinks in the BRICS framework that India needs to be wary of. Although BRICS certainly has the potential to challenge American hyperpower and create a Concert of Europe writ large, its significant Chinese component may make us prefer the devil we know.

An Antidote for Terrorism

There seems to be a common perception that terrorism is the new threat that faces the world. The United States, under President George W. Bush, launched a "War on Terror." In its name, two countries were invaded, the draconian (by civilised standards) Patriot Act was passed, and a set of other initiatives designed to fight terrorism. Although terrorism is by no means a trifling problem, the casualties of this war have been increased budget in security and the abeyance of some of our civil liberties. Admittedly, terrorism has taken a hard knock in areas where intelligence confirmed their existence, but that is no reason to sit on our laurels - the very nature of terrorism is that it retreats in visiblity to regain its advantage of invisibility and hits again at other unsuspecting targets.

It is perhaps time to think our strategies on combatting terrorism. For one, vast armies have been shown to be somewhat impotent against it. Secondly, to evade the high tech surveillance net, many terror groups have reverted to old fashioned low tech solutions - instead of mobile phones, they use drop boxes; instead of email, they meet in person. Third, terrorism is not particularly different from regular crime - save the one difference of public and political statements in their choice of targets, terrorists are by and large common criminals albeit some with better resources. The fact remains, however, that even the mightiest army in the world, the US, has no answer when the terror groups originate from rogue states. A nuclear Pakistan has allowed terror groups there a modicum of security against an Afghanistan-style invasion by either the US or India (in 1999). Arabia, though not technically a rogue state, is a powder keg in that as home of Sunni Islam's two holiest sites, action against it could set off a worldwide orgy of Islamist violence (supported by apologists both Muslim and academic).

So what can be done differently? There is no one answer, obviously, but one proposition is to scale back the rhetoric and tackle it based on the facts on the ground. Clearly, there are multiple levels to the problem but each needs its own solution. At the ground level, states should train and arm police better. Despite its size and complexity, India is a relatively under-policed country with about one police officer for each 1,200 citizens (national average - some states are better) as against the usual 1:250 ratio found in most western countries. Despite this, there are some 113,000 sanctioned positions for the post of beat constable that are unfilled. The reason for this is that many politicians ensure that only those who bribe them or who belong to the "right" caste or faith get selected to become a police officer. The absence of professional standards for all but higher-level police positions ensures that several entrants have matters other than the security of citizens as their first priority. In all too many cases, the police are tasked with ensuring the financial and political interests of their patrons often at the expense of the public interest. In the situation where India finds itself as one of the three focal points for jihadi terror (together with the United States and Israel), it would appear self-evident that the training of the police force would be given a high priority. Yet till now, six decades after the British left, there is zero - repeat zero - training given to police constables or indeed any member of the police force below the level of assistant superintendent, usually the junior most position formerly held by a British officer. Then, as now, those further down the chain were not trained except in the most rudimentary way. After all, it does not take a high IQ to learn how to wield a stick or bark out warnings to the public. Small wonder that the quality of the police force is, to put it charitably, uneven. It is a tribute to the civilizational values of the Indian people that despite this weakness in its administrative architecture, public order is relatively high, especially when compared to their neighbors. Even in the UK or in the United States it will be seen that crimes involving Indian-Americans are much less frequent in number than those involving those from countries that have sought to shed the heritage of India and embrace Wahabbism and its attitudes, such as Pakistan and increasingly Bangladesh. For example, even though Mumbai was swamped by torrents of rain at about the same time that Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, there was none of the law and order breakdown in Mumbai that was witnessed in New Orleans.

The district superintendent of police (DSP) is the key officer in each district. Although DSPs are usually seconded to the state administration from the centrally recruited Indian Police Service (IPS), the power of transfer is wielded by the chief minister and the home minister to ensure the DSP's subservience to their dictates. It may seem fantastical but the reality is that the average tenure (within a district) of the superintendent of police in India is about six months. There are cases of police officers (usually those unfortunate enough to be honest) that have been transferred as much as 11 times in one year, thereby playing havoc with the education of their children and the stability of family life.

Normally, it takes about six months for the district police chief to understand the local law and order situation as well as the capabilities of his or her personnel. After that, a minimum tenure of three years is needed to ensure that such knowledge as well as one's efficiency and motivation is reflected in performance. Sadly, those given such long tenures within a district are almost always officers who are ultra-obliging of the whims of their political masters. Clearly, at least in matters of police administration, things change very slowly in India, if at all. The registration of false cases against political and personal opponents and the immunity given to friends of the powerful is endemic in India. The only saving grace is that the disease of maladministration in most parts of India is (as yet) nowhere near the levels reached in Pakistan and Bangladesh, two countries where Wahabbism has found secure nests and from where the Wahabbis seek to infuse their poison into India's 157 million Muslims.

Although corruption is a problem, it is hard not to have empathy for the average policeman whose salary is around Rs. 8,000 in Bombay, one of the most expensive cities of the world. As a result, policemen (and women) are forced to seek other sources of income to make ends meet for themselves and their families. Sadly, the standard of living of the (honest) police constable in India has been reduced to but a tad above that of a street beggar. He has no training, no housing and certainly not a living wage. The wonder is that despite such neglect by those in authority, the police in India work an average of 16 hours per day and manage to keep the country within the ranks of the more stable in the world. Again, a huge part of the credit goes to the culture of India that ensures that the inhabitants of a millionaire's mansion can exist peaceably next to a teeming slum, with not even a single guard for protection. This can be compared to, for example, South Africa or Russia where the rich are forced to barricade themselves inside of fortresses to ensure their survival.

When we come to weaponry and equipment, the events of November 26-28, 2008, demonstrated on live television the police force's lack of firepower. For ten crucial hours they faced trained terrorist commandos while armed only with sticks or, at best, World War II vintage rifles. Except for the third of the police force that is now used almost entirely for the security of the country's political and official elite, the rest are pitifully armed. Also, such a high proportion of the total force set aside for the ritual assembly of police officers along different points of a VVIP's route and at the VVIP's meeting places is unreasonably high given that the total number of the worthies benefiting by such manpower.

During the 2009 election season, when Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi filed her nomination papers in the Rae Raebareli constituency the country's television audience was witness to the sycophancy of senior administrators towards their political bosses, a level that must surpass even the high levels of subservience recorded during the period of the Raj. The director-general (DG) of the Special Protection Group (SPG) was seen on television running alongside the car ferrying Sonia Gandhi to the town's election center. What was the DG (SPG) doing at the time? Was he monitoring the situation and assessing threats? Or keeping in touch with his personnel from across the country tasked as they are with the protection of numerous worthies including the prime minister? Not exactly. He was brushing away rose petals from the vehicle's hood! A crucial national security task indeed and certainly one deserving of the DG (SPG)'s undivided attention. It speaks well for the 58-year-old's level of fitness that one of the most senior police officers in the country was able to keep pace with Sonia's vehicle, albeit with a slight bout of panting towards the end.

Were such obsequious behaviors towards those in power be atypical they would not be a cause for worry. But they are becoming the norm. At least four major commissions have given suggestions for police reform - principally rescuing the force from the death-grip of the politicians - but they have been ignored. Politicians have taken care to pay lip service to the idea of a better police force - as Jim Hacker in Yes, Prime Minister reminds us, sometimes, you have to look as if you are trying to solve something but not actually solve it. An article in the Times of Indian in September reported on some basic facts about the police in India:

* Existing manpower -- 14.5 police personnel per 10,000 of population
* Desirable position -- 22 police personnel per 10,000 of population
* Gap between existing and desirable strength -- 5.96 lakh police personnel
* Total number of police stations -- 14,000
* Police stations in rural area -- 8,000
* Gap between existing and desirable strength in rural areas -- 3.4 lakh police personnel
* On an average, a cop gets in-service training only once in 20 years against the desirable norm of one in-service training every five years
* Total number of policemen in states -- 16 lakh
* Total 99,000 cops got in-service training in 2004; 69,000 in 2005 and 51,000 in 2006 -- decreasing trend
* Home ministry estimates that states will need Rs 25,808 crore annually for next five years to meet gaps in police strength and training

The police continue to act as the personal militias of the powerful rather than the guarantors of law and order for the ordinary citizen. According to a study done in Rajasthan Police Service, the self-perception of police was also found to be negative, as they themselves felt overworked, unappreciated and victims of political manipulation.  Unless the police in India are given the manpower, the remuneration and the equipment and training needed to evolve into a modern and professional force they are at risk of being ineffective against not just the average pickpocket but the next boatload of terrorists from Pakistan.

At a national level, it is perhaps a better idea to coordinate the efforts of various agencies. One thing India does not lack in is bureaucracy, and there are umpteem departments and agencies working in the same field to secure the Indian people from within and without. For example, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) perform the same role. Of course, the National Security Guards (NSG) seems to be the unit that does the grunt work after two bureaucracies have gone through the paperwork. On top of that, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) have their own fiefdoms within the intelligence and security community. The Border Security Force (BSF), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB), and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) also perform the same job - protecting the border from smuggling operations and infiltration. Then there are the state police. Bureaucracies need bureaucracies to keep them in line, obviously: the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) and the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) suggest better ways of storing police data, modernisation of the police force (good job there!), and other such things. What is sorely needed is a streamlining of Indian security operations. The collapsing of the agencies into a larger parent group and the sharing of information between them would be one small step in the right direction.

Finally, at a national level, there is perhaps the least that can be achieved. Trade with terror harbours such as Pakistan should be subject to a security tarrif; every opportunity should be used to remind the world of where the terror elements arise; strong partnerships must evolve between like-minded countries such as the Israel, France, Italy, Spain, Britain, and the United States (there is the danger of information leaks, of course). National policy must make every step that enriches the terror groups or their host nations more difficult - no cricket, more difficult travel permits (including Arabia), diversification of oil purchases and investment and research into alternative sources of energy such as nuclear power and hydrogen. At the same time, ties should be improved with moderate Muslim countries such as Jordan and Indonesia to give Indian diplomacy a voice and influence in the "dar al-Islam." Needless to say, these steps have to be taken diplomatically so as not to seem overtly hostile - whatever goodwill we do have needs to be maintained at all costs.

I have written in other articles (or discussions to articles) on the Centre-Right India blog that terrorism is a grassroots movement which cannot be defeated by state military might alone. The fight needs to be taken to the terrorists, at the lowest level they operate on - the hawaldars and beat police. Just like crime, or a virus, terrorism may never completely go away, for as long as a crime is committed for political reasons, terrorism will survive. That does not mean that, like crime (or a virus), it cannot be controlled or contained. It is time states took terrorism seriously and look at it as a criminal problem and not an ungodly apparition - it only gives the terrorists more power.